We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the spread of corporate disclosure policies.
Introduction
Prior studies show that corporate practices spread through director networks. Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) , for example, report that firms with boards interlocked to backdating firms are more likely to backdate employee stock options. Brown (2011) shows that firms are more likely to adopt corporate-owned life insurance as a tax shelter if they have boards linked to other firms that have adopted such shelters. More recently, Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013) find evidence of earnings management contagion in firms with interlocked boards. These studies support the notion that social networks, such as board interlocks, facilitate the exchange of information and the spread of corporate practices across firms. Not all corporate practices, however, diffuse in the same way (Davis and Greve 1997).
We examine whether firm disclosure policy spreads from one firm to another through shared directors. Specifically, we investigate the contagion of quarterly earnings guidance cessation.
Contagion of disclosure policy through director interlocks might present patterns that differ distinctly from the diffusion of other corporate practices for several reasons. First, because firms' disclosure policies tend to be "sticky" (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003; Skinner 2003; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005) , the effect of board interlocks on firms' disclosure policies could be limited.
Second, unlike the adoption of corporate actions examined in prior studies (e.g., option backdating, earnings management, tax shelters, etc.), guidance cessation represents the decommitment of existing corporate practice for which director learning might work differently. Third, information demand from outside constituents such as financial analysts and institutional investors may weaken disclosure policy contagion through interlocked directors. Fourth, divergences in the information environment and differences in the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosures across firms may affect how knowledge and experience spread to other firms in the director network.
Prior studies are inconclusive about the influence of directors on corporate disclosure policy. Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki (2005) examine director fixed effects on disclosure policy and conclude that their results are more consistent with directors and firms matching their policy preferences than with directors imposing their policy preferences on firms. Because of inherent endogeneity challenges, it is difficult to establish a causal relation between interlocked directors and disclosure policy based on panel data. In this paper, we take an event study approach and focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. We exploit the timing of director interlocks to tease out causality and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations such as endogenous director-firm matching.
We capture the spread of quarterly earnings guidance cessation via board networks by identifying director interlocks when a current director has gained guidance cessation experience through serving on the board of another company. For each calendar quarter, we identify guidance stoppers as firms that issued quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of the four pre-event quarters but gave no quarterly earnings guidance for any of the four quarters in the post-event period.
We compare these stoppers with a control sample of guidance maintainers that provided quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of four quarters in both the pre-and post-event periods.
We find that director interlocks to previous guidance stoppers increase the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Furthermore, we find that the positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to document that the outcomespecific experience directors gained from previous disclosure policy changes affects disclosure policy contagion. The influence of audit committee directors on the contagion of guidance cessation appears to be greater than that of non-audit committee directors, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Studies on social networks are vulnerable to the question of causal interpretation (Stuart and Yim 2010) . To ensure that the observed disclosure policy contagion via board interlocks is not an artifact of endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking, we conduct an array of additional analyses by exploring the timing of directors' appointments and departures. Our results do not support these alternative explanations. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firm disclosure policies spreading through interlocked directors, who carry their experience of quarterly earnings guidance cessation to the other directorships they hold. 1 Our study contributes to the accounting and finance literature as well as the social network literature. A growing body of research (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Bizjak et al. 2009; Stuart and Yim 2010; Brown 2011; Cai and Sevilir 2012; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2012) examines the role of board networks in corporate financial policy. We show that knowledge and experience gained through director networks also influence firm disclosure policy, especially decisions on quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Other studies (Feng and Koch 2010; Houston, Lev, and Tucker 2010; Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2011) show that firm characteristics influence guidance cessation decisions. We extend this literature by examining whether the inter-firm network of directors affects the diffusion of guidance cessations and by demonstrating that director networks serve as conduits for information that influences corporate disclosure policies.
1 Disclosure policy also may spread across firms through public channels instead of social networks. Houston et al. (2010) find that, of 222 stoppers over [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , only 26 firms (11.7%) publicly announce their policy changes. Because only a few guidance stoppers publicly announce and rationalize their decision to stop providing quarterly guidance and the majority just cease to provide guidance, we believe that information spillover through public channels cannot explain our results. In addition, we find that director-specific experience from prior cessation is important for disclosure policy contagion, which cannot be explained by spillover through public channels. Our results are robust to the exclusion of firms whose board members are connected to previous stoppers that publicly announce their guidance cessation decisions. The results are also robust to controlling for the potential ripple effect of the widely publicized Coca-Cola's guidance cessation announcement on December 13, 2002. Our paper is also related to Chiu et al. (2013) , who examine the effect of director interlocks on discretionary financial reporting choices. While they study the contagion of earnings management through the director network, we offer evidence on the spread of firm disclosure policy via interlocked directors. Furthermore, we also examine the effect of directorspecific experience. We show that interlocked directors' outcome-specific experience affects disclosure policy contagion.
Two recent papers examine executive fixed effects on firm disclosure policy. Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) find that top executives exhibit unique styles in their firms' voluntary disclosure choices. Brochet, Fraurel, and McVay (2011) find that firms' quarterly earnings guidance policy is associated with top executive turnovers. Although our paper is related to these studies as we also investigate the role of executives/directors, as opposed to firm-, industry-, or market-level characteristics, in explaining firm disclosure policy, there are important differences. First, while earlier studies rely on executive turnover to identify manager fixed effects, we focus on director interlocks through board networks to isolate the effects of experience and information sharing.
Second, manager fixed effects, as documented in Bamber et al. (2010) , capture the long-lasting impacts of managers' early-life experience. We show that the relatively recent experience that executives/directors gained from their directorships at previous stoppers also influences their voluntary disclosure decisions. Our paper complements earlier studies by offering new evidence on how individuals influence firm disclosure behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and research design. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 provides additional analyses, and Section 6 concludes.
Hypothesis development
Quarterly earnings guidance is a widespread, yet highly controversial, disclosure practice among public companies. On the one hand, managers can provide earnings forecasts to guide analysts' expectations within a reasonable range to avoid large earnings surprises and high stock volatility (Ajinkya and Gift 1984) , enhance investor confidence in managers' ability (Trueman 1986 ), decrease information asymmetry and cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991 , Lang and Lundholm 1993 , Coller and Yohn 1997 , Easley and O'Hara 2004 , and reduce litigation risks (Skinner 1994 (Skinner , 1997 . On the other hand, quarterly earnings guidance may encourage myopic managerial behavior at the cost of long-term growth when managers attempt to meet or beat the guided quarterly earnings numbers (Kasznik 1999 , Houston et al. 2010 , Chen et al. 2011 . Over the last two decades, firms have come under increasing pressure to end the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance from regulators However, cessation of quarterly earnings guidance, which represents a significant shift in firm disclosure policy, is a very difficult decision. Disclosure theories suggest that managers have incentive not to disclose unfavorable information (Verrecchia 1983 , Dye 1985 . Market participants may interpret the cessation of earnings guidance as a sign of weak firm performance.
Consistent with this view, recent evidence suggests that firms that stop offering quarterly earnings guidance tend to have poor prior performance and, on average, experience negative consequences, such as increases in analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion (Houston et al. 2010 , Chen et al. 2011 ).
Managers confronted with this difficult decision may seek advice from others who have dealt with similar problems successfully in the recent past. One convenient source of advice comes from board members who also serve as directors at other companies that have recently stopped quarterly earnings guidance. These directors can help managers with this decision by sharing their experiences at other firms and providing first-hand expertise in evaluating the disclosure policy change.
We argue that interlocked directors serve as conduits for information that can lead to the spread of corporate disclosure policies. The large network of interlocked directors creates channels through which private information flows. More information reduces outcome uncertainty and interlocked directors' first-hand experience reduces ambiguity. In addition, whether a firm changes its disclosure policy depends on the perceived costs and benefits of the change. Directors serving on the boards of other firms that have changed their disclosure policies may have biased estimates of the potential costs and benefits of the change. In particular, they are likely to underestimate the costs and overestimate the benefits.
2 As a result, we expect board interlocks to other firms that previously stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance to increase the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation.
We expect cross-sectional variation in disclosure policy contagion through the director network. Interlocked directors would be more (less) likely to transmit information if they experienced positive (negative) consequences of quarterly earnings guidance cessation at previous stoppers. Interlocked directors are also more likely to influence the focal firm's disclosure policy changes when they are the chair or a member of the audit committee, which oversees financial reporting.
Data and research design
3.1 Sample of guidance stoppers and maintainers
Our initial sample of guidance stoppers and maintainers comes from the First Call
Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database. We collect quarterly earnings guidance from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2011. We focus on the post-Reg FD period to eliminate the possibility of firms stopping public guidance and replacing it with private guidance. 3 We also require sample firms to be covered by the RiskMetrics Directors database, which provides extensive information on directors of S&P1500 firms and enables us to establish the existence of board interlocks.
Similar to Houston et al. (2010) , we refer to each calendar quarter during our sample period as an "event quarter," the preceding four quarters as the "pre-event" period, and the event quarter and the subsequent three quarters as the "post-event" period. We exclude quarterly earnings guidance issued after the fiscal quarter-end, because these pre-announcements are part of a firm's earnings announcement strategy rather than a guidance strategy. We define guidance stoppers based on quarterly guidance as opposed to annual guidance. 4 If a firm issued quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of the four pre-event quarters but gave no quarterly earnings guidance for any of the four quarters in the post-event period, we classify it as a guidance stopper.
If a firm provided quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of the four quarters in both the pre-and post-event periods, we define it as a guidance maintainer. For both the stopper and the 3 In October 2000, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Reg FD, which mandates that all publicly traded companies must disclose material information to all investors at the same time. Prior to Reg FD, managers often provided guidance to financial analysts and institutional investors through private channels. Wang (2007) provides evidence that, in the pre-Reg FD period, firms with higher proprietary information costs and more predictable earnings are more likely to provide private earnings guidance. Such firms might stop providing public guidance but continue to provide private guidance. Because we cannot observe private guidance, we cannot distinguish guidance cessation from replacing public guidance with private guidance, and therefore we cannot reliably identify guidance cessation in the pre-FD period. In addition, Reg FD changes the information environment. When firms' strategy for voluntary disclosure is fundamentally different between pre-and post-FD periods, applying director learning in the pre-FD period to the post-FD period is difficult. Therefore we follow Houston et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) and focus on the post-Reg FD period to ensure that our sample firms have truly stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance. 4 Much of the debate centers on quarterly guidance that may motivate managers to engage in myopic behavior. Houston et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) show that firms stop providing quarterly guidance, but not necessarily annual guidance, as a response to the call from critics. maintainer samples, following Houston et al. (2010) , we exclude firm-quarters in which the firm is delisted (through acquisitions or bankruptcy) in the six quarters beginning with the event quarter to avoid the influence of confounding factors associated with delisting.
For our initial sample of guidance stoppers, we search the Factiva database to ensure that they have indeed stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance. 5 We find that 89 firms are misclassified by CIG as stoppers, while in fact they continued providing quarterly earnings guidance in the post-event period. We exclude these firms from the guidance stopper sample. We (2010), we retain only one observation for each firm during our sample period. For a guidance stopper that appears in more than one quarter, we choose its earliest quarter. For a guidance 5 We search for the history of earnings or revenue guidance for all stoppers from a year before to a year after the event quarter. We search by keywords in the full texts of Business Wire, PR Newswire, Associated Press Newswires, and Reuters Significant Developments. The phrases used include two sets of keywords: (1) guidance, outlook, see(s), expect(s), expectation, forecast(s), project(s), estimate(s), higher, and lower; and (2) net, earnings, income, results, loss, gain, profit(s), improvement, better, performance, revenue(s), and sales. All keywords, except guidance, outlook, and expectation, are used in Kim et al. (2008) .
maintainer that appears in more than one quarter, we randomly choose a quarter from the qualified quarters as this firm's event quarter. The key variable in our study is Interlock, which indicates whether a firm is interlocked through a shared director with another firm that has previously stopped giving quarterly earnings guidance. For each firm-quarter observation in our sample, we use the RiskMetrics Director database to track the list of directors on its board in the years prior to the event quarter. We define a firm as having stopper interlocks if any of its directors also served on the board of another firm that stopped providing quarterly guidance during the two-year period prior to the event quarter. In other words, Interlock = 1 when any director of our sample firm served on the board of another company that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance at any point in the previous two years. 7 Since the interlock measure requires us to know whether a firm is interlocked with guidance stoppers in the previous two years, we cannot identify any stopper interlocks for sample firms in Stuart and Yim (2010) , who examine the role of board interlocks in change-in-control transactions in the private equity industry. The difference is that they use a five-year window in defining interlocks, while we use a two-year window. We choose a shorter window in defining interlocks because of our shorter sample period. As a robustness check, we also try a three-year window, and our results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
maintain their quarterly earnings guidance, and 79 (11.3%) of them have board interlocks with previous stoppers.
Research design
To examine the effect of board interlocks on the decision to stop quarterly earnings guidance, we estimate the following probit model:
where the dependent variable Stopper is an indicator variable that equals one for guidance stoppers and zero for maintainers, and Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The variable of interest is Interlock. Our primary hypothesis is β > 0, as board members' past guidance cessation experience positively affects the likelihood of guidance cessation for the other firms on whose boards they also serve. All variables are defined in the appendix.
We control for a number of firm characteristics that may affect firm disclosure policies. provide earnings guidance to mitigate litigation risk and accompanying cost (Skinner 1994 (Skinner , 1997 .
We measure litigation risk (LITIGATION) with the estimated probability of being sued by shareholders, using the litigation exposure model in Tucker (2007) and Houston et al. (2010) .
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Prior research also shows that both firm size and growth opportunities are related to a firm's disclosure policy. We control for firm size (LNMV) and growth opportunities (LNMB). Because firms' past guidance behavior could affect the cessation decision, we follow Chen et al. (2011) and include the number of quarterly earnings guidance made through quarter t-1 (LNCT). Furthermore, firms that initiate quarterly earnings guidance as a result of Reg FD may be more likely to cease providing guidance (Chen et al. 2011); therefore we include an indicator variable, REGFD, which equals one if the firm's first quarterly earnings guidance in the CIG database appears after the passage of Reg FD.
We also control for the potential effects of executive turnover and board structure on firm disclosure policy. Brochet et al. (2011) find that firms' quarterly earnings guidance policy is associated with CEO and CFO turnover, and thus we control for these variables. Firms with similar corporate governance structures may hire from the same pool of directors, and they are also more likely to engage in similar disclosure behaviors. We rely on the literature of board composition to identify factors that could affect the matching between directors and firms. We include board size, average board tenure, average director age, and the percentage of independent directors to account for board monitoring and advising (Raheja 2005; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008) . We also include a CEO=Chairman indicator to proxy for the balance of power between the CEO and the board and CEOs' stock ownership to control for the level of agency conflict between firm managers and shareholders. In Panel B of Table 2 , we compare the subsamples of 191 stoppers and 702 maintainers.
Summary statistics
Stoppers are more than twice as likely to have stopper-interlocked directors as maintainers. On average, stoppers are larger firms with bigger boards and a lower fraction of CEOs serving as chairman. Stoppers experience inferior performance in the previous year compared to maintainers, as seen in the negative market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns, deteriorating EPS, and a decline in the percentage of meeting or beating earnings expectations. In addition, while stoppers experience larger increases in analyst forecast dispersion, maintainers experience larger increases in analyst coverage and larger decreases in stock return volatility, suggesting that the information environment for stoppers deteriorates relative to that for maintainers. Table 3 presents the marginal effects from probit regressions of the probability that a firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance. We control for year fixed effect and industry fixed effect in all regressions. In column 1, we include only the control variables examined in Chen et al. (2011) for comparison purposes. We find that poorer stock performance in the year prior to the event quarter is associated with a significantly greater likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation, consistent with Chen et al. (2011) . We also find that in our sample, larger firms and firms experiencing an increase in analyst forecast dispersion or a decrease in informed investors, proxied by ∆AF, are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance.
Empirical results

Results from probit regressions
In column 2, we include only Interlock, the key variable of interest, in the regression.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Interlock is positively associated with the probability of guidance cessation. In column 3, we add control variables. We find that, after controlling for firm characteristics, firms with directors interlocked to previous stoppers are 12.5
percentage points more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance. Given that only 21 percent of our sample firms are stoppers, the effect is not only statistically but also economically significant. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if their directors have served on the boards of other firms that stopped quarterly earnings guidance in the recent past.
Consistent with Brochet et al. (2011) , firms are more likely to change their disclosure policies after CEO turnover. Among board characteristics, only the CEO=Chairman indicator is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of stopping quarterly earnings guidance. Our finding that powerful
CEOs are less likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance is consistent with the notion that investors demand more disclosure as a way to monitor powerful CEOs. consequences of guidance cessation at previous stoppers, these individuals might have a good (bad) lingering taste from their experience, and firms on whose boards they also serve would be more (less) likely to take similar actions. Chen et al. (2011) find an increase in analyst forecast dispersion and a decrease in forecast accuracy for stoppers but no change in analyst following and return volatility. To capture interlocked directors' guidance cessation experience at previous stoppers, we calculate the changes in analyst forecast dispersion, changes in analyst forecast error, changes in the number of analyst following, and changes in stock return volatility from the pre-event quarters to the post-event quarters around the previous stopper's quarterly earnings guidance cessation. For each of these variables, we create an indicator variable that captures the negative post-cessation experience at previous stoppers and let it interact with Interlock. We expect firms with interlocked directors who experienced more negative post-cessation outcomes at previous stoppers to be less likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance than firms with interlocked directors who experienced more positive outcomes. (1) and (2), indicating that the interlock effect does not exist for firms with interlocked directors who experienced an increase in analyst forecast dispersion and an increase forecast error. The sum of the coefficients is significantly positive in models (3) and (4). 12 By definition, each of our director-specific experience variables takes the value of zero for all firms with no directors interlocked to previous stoppers. The variation of these variables comes from firms with stopper-interlocked directors. The interactions of director-specific experience variables and Interlock are therefore the same as the director-specific experience variables themselves. For example, the interaction of Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) and Interlock is the same as that of Positive ∆(forecast dispersion) itself. The same applies to the variables Tenure<=2yrs and Migrated director in Table 8 . 13 We also try excess stock returns of a previous stopper in the year in which it stops issuing guidance, as an alternative proxy for negative experience for interlocked directors. Specifically, we calculate market-adjusted returns and industry-adjusted returns as well as changes of these returns from the pre-event period. We then include a negative-excess-return indicator as well as the interaction of this indicator and Interlock in the regressions. Untabulated results show an insignificant coefficient on the interaction of Interlock and each negative excess return indicator. This insignificant result is likely due to long-run returns being a noisy proxy for interlocked directors' experience at the previous stopper because of confounding events during the return measurement period.
where we define high (low) as an indicator if the value is higher (lower) than the sample median.
The results in Table 4 thus support our conjecture that interlocked directors' experience influences disclosure policy changes.
Because we measure director-specific experience over four post-event quarters, one concern is that interlocked directors at the focal firm that stops providing guidance within one year from the previous stopper's guidance cessation may not fully observe the consequences of stopping guidance at the previous stopper. To address this concern, we conduct an additional analysis in which stopper interlock is activated only for those guidance cessations occurring one year after the previous stopper's guidance cessation. We find that our results (untabulated) are robust to this alternative definition of interlock.
Audit committee directors
The effect of interlocks through the focal firm's (or the previous stopper's) audit committee directors may be greater than that of interlocks through non-audit committee directors, because the audit committee oversees financial reporting. When a firm has multiple directors interlocked with previous stoppers, if any of the interlocked directors is an audit committee member, we consider the firm as having an audit committee interlocked director. Table 5 presents the results comparing the interlock effect across different types of interlocked directors. In column 1, we focus on interlocks through the focal firm's audit committee versus non-audit committee directors. We find that both types of interlocked directors at the focal firm are associated with a greater probability of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. The effect of interlocks through the focal firm's audit committee directors appears to be greater than that of interlocks through the focal firm's non-audit committee directors, but the difference is not statistically significant (Likelihood Chisquare=0.221). In column 3, we examine the effect of board interlocks through previous stoppers' audit committee versus non-audit committee directors. Again, we find that both types of interlocked directors are positively associated with the likelihood of guidance cessation. We also examine audit committee chairs and find similar results, as shown in columns 2 and 4. Although the marginal effect of interlocked directors who serve as the audit committee chair is twice as large as the marginal effect of non-audit committee chair directors, the difference is not statistically significant, possibly because of a lack of power, as the number of stopper-interlocked directors who serve as the audit committee chair is very small. Table 3 . We also replicate analyses in Table 4 with the restricted sample and continue to find consistent results indicating that interlocked directors' experience at previous stoppers is important for focal firms' guidance cessation decisions. Thus our evidence is robust to controlling for the ripple effect of CocaCola's guidance cessation announcement.
Our results are also robust to the exclusion of firms whose boards are connected to previous stoppers that publicly announced their guidance cessation decision. We identify guidance cessation announcements by searching the full texts of Business Wire, PR Newswire, Associated Press Newswires, and Reuters Significant Developments, as well as conference call transcripts through Factiva. Ten firms in our sample have interlocked directors with previous public announcers. Untabulated results from the sample excluding these firms are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in Tables 3 and 4 . Therefore information spillover through the public channel cannot explain our results.
Multiple board interlocks
In our sample, there are cases where the focal firm is interlocked with multiple previous stoppers. Among 131 sample firms interlocked with previous stoppers, 103, 24, 3, and 1 are interlocked with one, two, three, and four previous stoppers, respectively. There are also cases where the focal firm is interlocked with previous stoppers through multiple directors; 97, 27, 6, and 1 out of 131 stopper-interlocked firms are interlocked through one, two, three, and four directors, respectively. We examine whether having additional interlocks with previous stoppers or having multiple interlocked directors has any incremental impact on the likelihood of guidance cessation by adding a multiple-interlock indicator. While the marginal effect of
Interlock remains positive and significant, we find no evidence that additional interlocks have a significant incremental effect, suggesting that it is the existence, rather than the number, of stopper interlocks that matters for a firm's decision to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance.
14 5 Additional analyses 5.1 Director-firm matching 14 We also re-estimate our probit regressions by replacing the Interlock indicator with the natural logarithm of (1 + number of interlocked stopping firms) or the natural logarithm of (1 + number of stopper-interlocked directors). Untabulated results show positive and statistically significant marginal effects of alternative stopper interlock variables, consistent with the results in Table 3 .
Our empirical findings so far are consistent with our hypothesis that board interlocks have an impact on disclosure policy changes. Directors carry their experience of quarterly earnings guidance cessation to other directorships they hold, and their knowledge influences the guidance cessation decision at other firms whose boards they join. This causal interpretation, however, naturally faces some endogeneity challenges. One challenge comes from endogenous director-firm matching, as some omitted variables may determine both board composition and the guidance cessation decision. For example, firms from the same region, firms in the same industry, or firms sharing the same auditors, investors, or analysts are likely to have interlocked directors, and they are also likely to provide similar disclosures. In this section, we attempt to rule out endogenous director-firm matching as an explanation.
First, we control for the focal firm's geographic proximity with all previous stoppers. In particular, for each firm-year, we compute a Stopper geographic proximity variable as the natural logarithm of (1 + total number of previous stoppers in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)). MSA data are from the U.S. Census Bureau's MSA cross-map. Untabulated results
show that controlling for proximity to previous stoppers does not affect our results. We continue to find a positive and significant relation between stopper interlocks and the likelihood of guidance cessation. The proxy for stopper proximity is not significantly associated with the likelihood of guidance cessation.
Tse and Tucker (2010) document within-industry herding of earnings warnings. In our baseline regressions, we already include industry fixed effects. To further control for industryspecific effect, we include in our probit regression a Stopper industry activity variable, which is defined as the natural logarithm of (1 + number of stoppers in the same Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry and in the same MSA), as an additional control variable.
Untabulated results show that the positive relation between stopper interlocks and guidance cessation is robust to controlling for such an industry-specific effect. The proxy for industry trend is not significantly associated with the likelihood of guidance cessation.
We next consider the impact of sharing auditors, investors, or analysts. Demands from common auditors, investors, or analysts could lead firms to make similar corporate decisions on director appointments and disclosure policies. Jung (2013), for example, finds that a firm's decision to follow the industry first mover in providing more market-risk disclosures is positively associated with an increase in the institutional investor overlap between the two firms. To alleviate the concern that demands from overlapping auditors, investors, or analysts are driving the positive relation between board interlocks and quarterly earnings guidance cessation, we control for overlapping auditors, institutional investors, and analysts. Our proxy for overlapping auditors is the natural logarithm of (1 + total number of previous stoppers who share the same-office auditor as the focal firm). 15 To capture overlapping investors, we compute the average number of overlapping institutional investors between the focal firm and all previous guidance stoppers, scaled by the total number of institutional investors of the focal firm, both measured in the quarter prior to the event quarter. Similarly, our proxy for overlapping analysts is the average number of overlapping analysts between the focal firm and all previous guidance stoppers, scaled by the total number of analysts of the focal firm in the quarter prior to the event quarter. With controls for auditor, investor, and analyst overlap, we continue to find a positive and significant marginal effect of Interlock (untabulated), suggesting that our results are robust to controlling for overlapping auditors, investors, and analysts.
Even after controlling for geographic proximity, industry-level disclosure activity, and overlapping auditors, investors, and analysts, endogenous director-firm matching stemming from unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics may still drive our results. To address this concern, we conduct two more tests by exploiting the timing of director appointments. First, if the stopper interlock effect is caused by director-firm matching, conditional on firms being matched with specific directors, the timing of the director appointment should not matter. We include an indicator variable, Director-firm matching, which equals one if a firm has a director who serves on the board of another company that stops providing quarterly earnings guidance at any point during our sample period and zero otherwise. If director-firm matching solely explains our results, the marginal effect of Interlock should become insignificant once we include the Director-firm matching indicator. We find this not true, however. Table 6 Column 1 shows that even after controlling for Director-firm matching, the marginal effect of Interlock remains positive and statistically significant.
Second, we track those directors who depart from a guidance stopper's board before it stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance (Left directors) to determine whether other firms whose boards they join have a higher likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. Column 2 of Table 6 shows that the stopper interlock effect is robust after controlling for Left director. In contrast, Left director is not significantly related to the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation. 16 Overall, it is unlikely that director-firm matching can explain the positive effect of stopper interlocks on the likelihood of stopping quarterly earnings guidance.
Strategic board stacking
Another explanation for our findings may be that a firm planning to stop quarterly earnings guidance may actively seek out and appoint directors who serve on the boards of other companies that have recently done so. 17 We find that the average tenure of stopper-interlocked directors in our sample is 9.0 years (measured at the time of stopping); interlocked directors with such a long tenure are very unlikely to be recruited for the purpose of stopping quarterly earnings guidance.
Although we believe that strategic board stacking is implausible, we nonetheless address this concern in two ways. First, the board stacking effect should come mostly from recently appointed directors. If we find a robust interlock effect on quarterly earnings guidance cessation for longseated directors, the interlock effect is unlikely to be driven by strategic board stacking. We create an indicator variable, Tenure<=2yrs, which equals one if the stopper-interlocked directors have a tenure of two years or less and zero otherwise. If a firm has multiple directors interlocked with previous stoppers, we define Tenure<=2yrs indicator based on the director with the shortest tenure. In our sample, only 23 firm-quarters are associated with stopper-interlocked directors whose tenures are two years or shorter. In Table 7 column 1, we include the interaction of Tenure<=2yrs and Interlock. We find that interlocked directors with short tenures are not more likely to stop quarterly earnings guidance, and the marginal effect of Interlock continues to show up positively and significantly.
We also follow Stuart and Yim (2010) to examine migrated directors to better understand board stacking. Consider the scenarios in Figure 1 For a firm that has multiple directors interlocked with previous stoppers, we define Migrated director = 1 if the firm has at least one migrated director. We find that only three firm-quarters in our sample are associated with migrated directors. Column 2 of Table 7 shows that migrated directors are not more likely to stop quarterly earnings guidance, inconsistent with the notion that firms stack up directors with guidance cessation experience to prepare for stopping quarterly earnings guidance. More importantly, the marginal effect of the Interlock variable remains positive and statistically significant in Table 7 , and the magnitude resembles that in the baseline specification in column 3 of Table 3 , suggesting that strategic board stacking alone cannot explain the positive stopper interlock effect on guidance cessation.
Board stacking also does not appear to be a common practice used to influence guidance decision by our sample firms. Only 23 firm-quarters are associated with stopper-interlocked directors who have a tenure of two years or less and only three firm-quarters are associated with migrated directors. Low power may have contributed to the insignificant marginal effects of those variables. This does not change the main intuition, however; it is unlikely that our results are driven by strategic board stacking in firms that plan to stop quarterly earnings guidance.
Analysis of guidance initiation
We also explore whether shared directors influence the initiation of quarterly earnings guidance. We focus on initiation of regular quarterly earnings guidance by classifying as a guidance initiator a firm that issued no quarterly earnings guidance in the four pre-event quarters but issues guidance in at least three out of the four quarters in the post-event period. We search the Factiva news database and exclude firms that are misclassified by CIG as initiators from the guidance initiator sample. The control sample consists of firms that provide no quarterly earnings guidance in both the pre-and post-event periods. We identify 64 guidance initiators and 737 control firms from the first quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2010. We define a firm as having initiator interlocks if any of its directors also served on the board of another firm that initiated regular quarterly guidance during the two years prior to the event quarter. During our sample period, five out of the 64 initiators are interlocked with previous initiators through shared directors, and 54 out of the 737 non-initiators have board interlocks with previous initiators. There is no effect of interlock experience on guidance initiation.
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Conclusion
We examine whether social networks influence firm disclosure policies. We find that network ties via board interlocks increase the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation and that director-specific experience from prior quarterly earnings guidance cessation matters for disclosure policy contagion. We find that the positive director network effect on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with stopper-interlocked directors who experienced positive consequences of stopping quarterly earnings guidance at the previous stoppers.
We find that both audit committee directors and non-audit committee directors contribute to the contagion of guidance cessation. The influence of audit committee directors appears to be greater than that of non-audit committee directors, although the difference is not statistically significant. We obtain similar results if we examine audit committee chairs.
Further analyses suggest that disclosure policy contagion is not caused by endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. Our results are robust to controlling for potential correlated omitted variables, such as geographical proximity, industry trends, and overlapping auditors, investors, and analysts. Following Stuart and Yim (2010), we exploit the sequence of events in the data to further address the endogenous director-firm matching caused by unobserved factors. The stopper interlock effect is robust even after controlling for director- 18 The results utilizing a control sample of firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance in at least three out of the four quarters both in the pre-and post-event periods are similar.
firm matching and strategic board stacking. Overall, the evidence is consistent with our causal hypothesis that firm disclosure policies spread through social networks such as board interlocks.
Our study contributes to the accounting and finance literature, as well as the social network literature, by demonstrating that board networks serve as conduits for information that influences corporate disclosure policies and that the interlocked directors' outcome-specific experience affects policy contagion through shared directors. We also add to the voluntary disclosure literature by demonstrating that firm disclosure behavior is not only determined by firm and industry characteristics but also influenced by larger social structures. We show that knowledge and experience gained through director networks are important determinants of the quarterly earnings guidance cessation, an important change in firm disclosure policy. Our study can help investors and regulators better understand the mechanics behind voluntary disclosure changes. Future research should control for the effect of director interlocks when examining disclosure policy changes. Researchers should also consider that knowledge and experience that directors gain from other directorships might influence disclosure and other corporate policy changes.
Appendix Variable definitions
Variable Description BHRET Market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns in the one-year period prior to the event quarter.
∆PMBAF
Change in the percentage of quarters for which the firm meets or beats consensus analyst forecasts in the pre-event period (quarters t-4 to t-1, where quarter t is the event quarter) relative to the year prior to the pre-event period (quarters t-8 to t-5).
∆STDret
Change in the standard deviation of daily stock returns calculated over the pre-event period relative to the standard deviation of daily stock returns measured over the preceding 252 trading days.
∆DISP
Change in the analyst forecast dispersion, calculated as the standard deviation of the last analyst forecasts prior to quarter t-1 earnings announcement scaled by lagged stock price, relative to the same measure in quarter t-8.
∆AF
Change in analyst following, calculated as the change in the number of analysts covering the firm in quarter t-1 relative to the same measure in quarter t-8.
∆PINST
Change in the percentage of institutional ownership, calculated as the change in the percentage of shares held by institutional investors in quarter t-1 relative to quarter t-4.
∆LTPINST
Change in long-run institutional ownership, calculated as the difference in the aggregate percentage ownership held by dedicated investors and quasi-indexers in quarter t-1 relative to quarter t-4. LITIGATION Litigation risk, the estimated probability of being sued by shareholders, based on the litigation exposure model as in Tucker (2007) and Houston et al. (2010) .
MV
Market value of equity at the end of the pre-event period in millions of dollars. We use LNMV, the natural logarithm of MV in probit regressions.
MB
Market-to-book ratio at the end of the pre-event period. We use LNMB, the natural logarithm of MB in probit regressions.
LNCT
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of management quarterly forecasts made through quarter t-1 in the CIG database.
REGFD
An indicator variable that equals one if the firm's first management forecast on the CIG database occurs after the passage of Regulation FD.
CEO turnover
An indicator variable that equals one if there is a change in CEO in the fiscal year prior to the event quarter.
CFO turnover
An indicator variable that equals one if there is a change in CFO in the fiscal year prior to the event quarter.
Board size
The number of directors on the board.
Average board tenure
The average number of years serving on the board.
Average board age
The average age of directors on the board.
% of independent directors
Percentage of independent directors on the board.
CEO=Chairman
An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board.
CEO ownership
The percentage of CEO's stock ownership.
∆EPS
The average change in diluted EPS in the four pre-event quarters relative to their respective last year same quarter values, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period.
FutureEPS
The average change in diluted EPS from the four pre-event quarters to the four post-event quarters, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period.
LOSS
The proportion of loss-reporting quarters in the pre-event period.
Positive ∆(forecast dispersion)
An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers have experienced positive changes in forecast dispersion from the preevent quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise.
Positive ∆(forecast error)
An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers have experienced positive changes in forecast error from the preevent quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise.
Negative ∆(analyst following)
An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers have experienced negative changes in analyst from the pre-event quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise.
Positive ∆(return volatility)
An indicator variable that equals one if interlocked previous stoppers have experienced positive changes in daily return volatility from the pre-event quarters to the post-event quarters and zero otherwise.
Director-firm matching
An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has a director who serves on the board of another company that stops providing quarterly earnings guidance at any point during our sample period and zero otherwise.
Left director
An indicator variable that equals one if any director of the firm departed from a guidance stopper's board before the stopping event and zero otherwise.
Tenure<=2yrs
An indicator variable that equals one if the stopper-interlocked directors have a tenure of two years or less and zero otherwise.
Migrated director
An indicator variable that equals one if the director who triggers the stopper interlock joined the focal after the director's guidance stopping experience and zero otherwise. This table reports the distribution of our sample by calendar year-quarters. Stoppers are firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of four pre-event quarters but give no quarterly earnings guidance for the event quarter and three post-event quarters. Maintainers are firms that provide quarterly earnings guidance for at least three out of the four quarters in both the pre-and post-event periods. The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable, Stopper, is an indicator variable that equals one for firm-quarters if the firm stops providing quarterly earnings guidance in that calendar quarter and zero otherwise. Interlock through focal firm's audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if any stopper-interlocked director is an audit committee member of the firm and zero otherwise, where a stopper interlocked-director is a director who served on the board of another company that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance in the previous two years (previous stopper). Interlock through focal firm's non-audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a stopperinterlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director is an audit committee member of the firm and zero otherwise. Interlock through focal firm's audit committee chair is an indicator variable that equals one if any stopper interlocked director is the audit committee chair of the firm and zero otherwise. Interlock through focal firm's non-audit committee chair is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a stopper-interlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director is the audit committee chair of the firm and zero otherwise.
Interlock through previous stopper's audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if any stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee member of previous stoppers and zero otherwise.
Interlock through previous stopper's non-audit committee members is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a stopper-interlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee member of previous stoppers and zero otherwise. Interlock through previous stopper's audit committee chair is an indicator variable that equals one if any stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee chair of previous stoppers and zero otherwise. Interlock through previous stopper's non-audit committee chair is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a stopper-interlocked director but no stopper-interlocked director was an audit committee chair of previous stoppers and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. Interlock is an indicator variable that equals one if any director of the firm served on the board of another company that stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance at any point in the previous two years and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. pvalues are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.
